Gardening a thousand
Introduction
In today's digital world, product platforms thrive on the availability and quality of complementary products and services, such as apps that drive the success of smartphones (Boudreau, 2012) . Often, digital platforms are complemented by products or services that are developed by complementors such as independent third-party developers (e.g., Tiwana, 2010; Boudreau, 2012; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Eaton et al., 2015) . For platform owners it is therefore key to attract a large pool of independent, skilled complementors. To date, most of the literature has focused on the challenge of getting complementors 'on board' to realize a sufficient quantity of complements (e.g., Boudreau 2010; Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015) . For example, Boudreau (2012) suggests how important it is for platform owners to "let a thousand flowers bloom." However, building on this metaphor, we suggest that complements can be seen as plants that continue flourish and blossom provided that they receive appropriate cultivation and gardening. Without the necessary care, the flowers will lose their beauty after short time. In other words, platform owners also need to ensure that the quality of complementary products reaches and maintains a satisfactory level for an extended period of time. This aspect of product platforms has received much less research attention.
Since a platform and its interfaces evolve over time (e.g., Gawer, 2014; Tiwana et al., 2010) , the challenge of ensuring quality not only concerns platform owners' initial quality assessment of complements. Platform owners also need to ensure maintenance work on complements over time to fix latent problems that become visible with passage of time, keep them up to date with evolving customer needs and preferences, and ensure continued compatibility with new versions of the platform product (Tiwana, 2016) . For example, apps will eventually break if they are not updated with new generations of a platform, and will lose their value for users and the platform as a whole. This problem spurred Apple to actively remove apps that crash or need an essential update from the App Store as of September 2016.
For the complementors, this means that the development of complementary products or services cannot stop after their launch if they intend to offer a continuously high level of quality. In fact, the perceived quality of their complements may decrease even if their products maintain perfectly functional. For example, over time competition between complementors may increase, affecting users' perceptions of quality of complements. At the same time, platform owners may incorporate functionality previously provided by complementors in their core product (Evans et al., 2006) and multiple complements may compete by providing similar or better functionality and user experience in their complements, thereby making other products and services obsolete. Taken together, we therefore argue that complement quality should be considered over time and relative to the state of the platform and its ecosystem.
Ensuring complement quality over time poses a challenge to platform owners because they depend on the continued maintenance work of complementors, over which they have no direct control. If at all, complementors have an obligation to maintain their products and services typically only towards their users but not the platform owner. However, since obsolescence of complements creates negative externalities for the overall ecosystem, platform owners need other ways to orchestrate maintenance of their ecosystem (Wareham et al. 2014) . This paper aims to address this challenge by asking the following research question: How is the quality of complementary products and services in digital platform ecosystems ensured over time?
To achieve our research objective we performed an inductive field study of the ecosystem around the Philips Hue smart lighting platform. Philips Hue is a system consisting of consumer LED light bulbs that can be controlled from a smartphone.
Besides the official Philips Hue app, over 200 complementary third-party apps have been developed for the Hue platform. We draw upon multiple data sources, including archival data on apps, interviews with app developers, and observations and combine mixed methods of analysis.
We show how the interdependencies between the evolving technical platform components (platform core modules and its interfaces) and the ecosystem actors (complementors, the users and the platform owner) drive quality-enhancing practices by complementors. Our case study indicates a key role for users (specifically their interactions with complementors), and revealed how ensuring quality benefits from a proactive approach that takes into account the different interdependencies in play.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. To ground our study, we first review the literature on (digital) platform ecosystems, followed by a description of our research setting and the data collected. Then we present the findings from our empirical study. We end the paper with our contributions and discuss the implications of our findings.
Theoretical background

Platforms and platform ecosystems
Digital platforms consist of a core product platform, complementary products and services that are interoperable with the product, and interfaces that enable such interoperability (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Tiwana, 2013; Thomas et al., 2014) . For instance, the core product in digital platforms includes the platform's operating system software and the device (e.g., smartphone or tablet) on which it runs. Following Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2015), we view the platform as the "technological architecture", and the platform ecosystem comprises all actors that have a "common interest in the prosperity of a digital technology for materialising their own product or service innovation" (Selander et al., 2013, p. 184) . Actors in a platform ecosystem can be categorized in three types: the platform owner (e.g., Eisenmann et al, 2006 ), complementors (e.g., Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1997 ), and users (Gawer, 2014 .
The 'core' of a platform typically offers only basic functionality. Complements (i.e., complementary products and services) build on such a platform and form a 'periphery' (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009) , and enhance the value of the overall platform by introducing variety for users (e.g., Boudreau, 2012) . Examples of complements in digital platforms are apps (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013) or physical products, such as smart phone devices and peripherals. Through the generative properties of digital technologies (Yoo et al, 2010) , user value can continuously evolve when new complementary products and services become available for the core platform (Yoo et al., 2012; Garud et al., 2008) .
Interfaces are key components of the platform that facilitate interoperability between the platform core and complements (e.g., Baldwin & Woodard, 2009 ). They are typically standardized, so that a single set of interfaces enable the coupling of a large variety of complements (e.g. USB interface connecting PC peripherals). In digital platforms, application programming interfaces (APIs) are key interfaces that facilitate interaction and data exchange between the complementary apps and the platform core (Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013) .
Platform owners, also referred to as platform leaders (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) or keystone firms (Iansiti & levien, 2004) , control the platform core and its interfaces.
Increasingly, platform owners make their platforms accessible to "outsiders" and more or less openly share APIs and other interfaces so that independent third-party developers can offer complementary products and services (e.g., Boudreau, 2010).
Adopting such a "platform strategy" makes sense when there is a high "option's value" (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009 ), e.g., when users have heterogeneous and difficult to predict needs and wishes that can be met by the "long tail [...] of extremely specialized niche players" (Yoo et al., 2012 (Yoo et al., , p. 1402 . Complementors may have better insights in these specific user needs, as well as different knowledge and skills required how to meet them.
Complementors are typically independent third-party developers and work autonomous, i.e. they are not hired or contracted in the traditional sense (e.g., Adner & Kapoor, 2010; Boudreau, 2010; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013) . On the one hand, this makes them more difficult to control; on the other hand, they retain the property rights over their development work, which tends to result in high commitment and effort (Wareham et al., 2014) . Third-party developers can be firms or individual developers (professionals or hobbyists, paid or unpaid, see e.g., Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015) , and can be organized as collaborative communities or competitive markets (Boudreau & Lakhani, 2009 ).
Platform participants can also fulfill more than one role at once, or shift roles over time (Gawer, 2014) . For example, platform owners may also provide their own complementary services (e.g., while Apple's iOS platform thrives on third-party apps like WhatsApp, Apple's own apps such as iMessage are also important services that create value for users). Examples of changing roles are users that become app developers over time.
Complements: quantity and quality
In order to succeed as a platform ecosystem, innovation by external complementors needs to address two key conditions: (1) having a large number (quantity) of complements and (2) having good (high quality) complements. Below we briefly review and compare the relevant literature on both aspects.
Complement quantity.
Research from an economics perspective has been mainly concerned with the amount of complementors offering products and services that enhance the value of the core platform. The logic behind this consideration is that a richer ecosystem would attract a larger number of users to a platform (Gawer, 2014) , and thereby create opportunities associated with (indirect) network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Rochet & Tirole, 2003) . That is, when the number of complementors increases, this will positively affect the installed based of users.
Ironically, complementors in turn are attracted by platforms with a large user base.
Consequently, in platform ecosystems, both sides need to get 'on board'. To illustrate:
"video game developers will create games only for platforms that have a critical mass of players, because developers need a large enough customer base to recover their upfront programming costs. In turn, players favor platforms with a greater variety of games" (Eisenmann et al., 2006, p. 2-3) .
Thus, to create value for their users, platform owners need to find ways to attract large numbers of complementors. As a result, platform owners employ aggressive "get-big-fast" approaches to compete with other platforms, aimed at achieving "winner takes all" effects (cennamo & Santalo, 2013) . For that to happen, platforms owners need to deal with the "chicken-and-egg problem" in a platform's early days (e.g., Evans, 2009), because complementors will only develop complements when sufficient users are using the platform whereas users will only adopt the platform when sufficient complements are available (eisenmann et al., 2009) . To this end, platform owners actively recruit complementors, for example through "developer evangelization," i.e. marketing efforts targeted specifically at developers (such as developer conferences and hackathons) in order to attract developers to use the platform's API (Evans, 2006 ). Yet, having too many complements may also lead to fierce competition and result in negative crowding out effects (Boudreau & Jeppesen,
2014).
Complement quality. A second, less prominent concern in the platform literature is the quality of complements, which in turn influences the overall value created by the platform ecosystem. In this paper, we discern two dimensions of complement quality:
(1) the functionality provided and (2) the integrity of the complement (i.e. how well it interoperates with the platform), which we discuss in turn.
First, functionality of complements matters because platforms benefit most from complementary products and services when these address a large variety of heterogeneous and very specific end-user needs. How complements perform in terms of unique content or utility will shape their fate in the competition among complements and their contribution to the value of the platform. Some complements may never get traction, or just serve a small niche, whereas others may become "killer apps" (Boudreau, 2015; evans, 2006) . For example, the availability of "superstar" games for gaming console platforms proved to have a large positive effect on the overall sales of the console hardware (Binken & Stremersch, 2009) . At the same time, other complements may have "dubious value" (eaton et al., 2015) and may actually have detrimental effects for the overall platform. An example is the iPhone app "I am Rich", that lead to much controversy because it was priced $999.99 but offered no real features beyond showing other people that they were able to afford it. As such, functionality is the first core dimension for complement quality.
A second aspect of quality addresses the more technical side of how well a complement interfaces with a platform (e.g., Garud & Kumaraswamy, 1995) . When there are inconsistencies between the complement and the platform, compatibility issues arise and the integrity of the overall system decreases. For example, smartphone apps may vary in "the degree to which an app faithfully uses standards and protocols predefined by the platform owner (e.g., platform-specific APIs, data formats, and protocols) to interact with the platform" (Tiwana, 2016, p.47) . Compliance to standardized interfaces (as opposed to e.g., using workarounds) ensures a minimum standard of quality and reduces the chances of glitches as a result of suboptimal integrations, and is thus expected to improve user experience.
In particular in crowded markets for complements, the discrepancy between high and low quality complements may cause tensions in the ecosystem and result in decreasing overall performance. As Wareham et al. (2014) note: "if a thousand flowers grow, inevitably, some will be undesirable and harmful to the ecosystem. In the extreme, the unconstrained growth of low-quality innovations can kill a platform" (p. 2012). To avoid such negative externalities of poor quality complements on the overall ecosystem, platform owners employ various governance and control mechanisms to "encourage desirable behaviors" by complementors with the ultimate goal to ensure quality (Tiwana et al., 2010; Wareham et al., 2014) . As such, integrity is the second core dimension for complement quality.
For platform owners, it is important to ensure the quality of complements. A popular form of control is through gatekeeping: platform owners acting as 'bouncers' deciding what complements they admit to their platform (Tiwana, 2014) . Such control typically includes a screening process where complements are evaluated. To illustrate, Mozilla checks all extensions developed for Firefox based on a set of prespecified criteria. When they discover "coding bad practices and security problems" (Tiwana, 2015) , apps will not be approved and modifications will be required before they will get shared with the users. Not only the level of control, also the reliability and transparency of the review process is important for maintaining quality, as uncertainty and subjectivity about criteria or decisions may eventually push off valuable app developers (Tiwana, 2014) .
Such a gatekeeping strategy, however, is not always possible for platform owners: they may lack the means to control the market or simply want to avoid a "policing" approach. An alternative strategy then might be to reward high quality and thereby incentivize developers to invest in better quality of their complements. For example, Clausen et al. (2013) studied Facebook apps, where apps with high user ratings (a proxy for app quality) were rewarded by Facebook by lifting several API restrictions.
The authors show that employing such "soft quality incentives" is a powerful way to manage complement quality, and even argue "that hard exclusion of low-quality participants may not be necessary" (Clausen et al., 2013, p. 187 ).
In sum, ensuring both quantity of complements and the quality of the individual complement are two key conditions for successful digital platform ecosystems. The quantity and quality dimension cannot be seen separately, instead they also interact and often represent a trade-off. As a result, platform owners may employ governance mechanisms that "sacrifice quantity to a certain degree in order to increase the average quality" (Hagiu, 2011, p. 20) . Trading in some quantity in the favor of better quality may be particularly necessary in established platform ecosystems that already have large numbers of complementors on board. But even when platform owners successfully attract a large number of complementors and manage to prevent low quality complements from entering the ecosystem, maintaining the functionality of complements and their compatibility with other parts of the ecosystem remains a challenge over time.
Both temporal dynamics (the evolution of the platform and its complements over can become obsolete (e.g., when Apple introduced 'Spaces' as an integral feature of its OSX platform, they enveloped functionality that was earlier provided by third-party software packages). In addition, when competition among complementors increases, the level of functionality that users expect from complements may keep on rising.
As a result of such developments, a complement that was high quality when first introduced may become obsolete and considered dysfunctional over time. Therefore, the integration between platform and complement is not a "one-shot task", but an ongoing process (Tiwana et al., 2010) .
In other words, what constitutes 'complement quality' is subject to change as result of evolution in the platform components and competing complements.
However, the literature on platform governance has not yet explicitly addressed such temporality and interdependence aspects of complement quality in platform ecosystems 4 . To study how these aspects of complement quality affect the management of platform ecosystems, we zoom in on the changes, notably the updating (releasing new versions) of the platform and its complements.
Methods
Research setting
To answer our research question 'how is the quality of complementary products and services in digital platform ecosystems ensured over time?' we study the Philips Third, the vision of Philips Lighting is to provide an easy to use, high quality consumer product. With a premium price they target the top segment in the connected light market. Achieving an excellent user experience, whether that is during set-up of the bridge and bulbs or in their own user interface in the official app, is what drives innovation decisions within Philips Lighting. However, as part of the user experience became dependent on the services provided by independent thirdparty developers, it is in this case of even higher importance to ensure quality of the complements over time. In addition, because the third-party apps are released on iOS and Android, the market place is not controlled by Philips Lighting but instead by Apple and Google. As a result, Philips Lighting is limited in the means they can use to control the output quality by the developers, making it an interesting setting to study our research question. 
Data collection and analysis
Following the principles of engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007) we collaborate closely with key informants in the Philips Hue team. We started our research with a broad interest in the relation and alignment between platform owner and third-party app developers. Through early exploratory interviews, we identified core challenges faced by the Hue team and used these insights to sharpen our research focus in a way that both practical and theoretical interests were met. We collected a variety of data over a one-year period (November 2015 -December 2016 . embedded research at philips hue. First, to better understand the Hue ecosystem, its history and the internal organization, the first author was an (unpaid) embedded researcher at Philips Hue. Starting in November 2015, she was on average one day a week at the Philips lighting office. She was given her own entrance badge, which allowed her to move around freely. Being physically present has the advantage of blending in easily with the members of the department, resulting in numerous informal conversations with people from different teams within different departments (e.g., Marketing, Development). During these 'coffee talks' she could ask small clarifications questions, grasp the organizational culture, and get a real time picture of how innovation activities are organized, which in turn was valuable to understand the phenomena we are investigating in its context. Furthermore, she had her own internal company e-mail address, to facilitate making appointments easily through Outlook and to get invitations for meetings and (social) gatherings. Most importantly, the first author attended recurring and ad hoc meetings of the team that was responsible for partnerships and the developer community. During these meetings team members discussed and reflected upon ongoing projects and the steps as well as challenges they need to overcome to achieve their goals. While observing the meetings the first author also got informed about the usage of technical and professional terms that are used in the internal and external organization. Besides these team meetings, the first author also observed general department meetings and events like a 24-hours developer hackathon. During each day in the field, impressions and insights were captured for analysis through (digitally recorded) notes.
More structured data was collected through (formal) interviews with Philips lighting employees. For example, we interviewed the "inventors" of the Hue, the developer community managers, internal developers, project leaders, and researchers.
These interviews allowed us to go back in time and inquire about past events and decisions. If possible, interviews were voice recorded and later transcribed, if this was not the case we made extensive notes. In total we performed 12 interviews, with 11 informants; during three interviews we spoke with two people at the same time, and three interviews were a follow up interview with a key informant.
The advantage of being an embedded researcher is the possibility to gather indepth data. Also, it allowed us to constantly validate our findings through ongoing daily discussions with our key informants or intermediate presentations of emerging results. At the same time, being this close to the phenomena of study is the risk of "going native" (Gioia et al., 2013) . We ensured credibility of our study by constantly complementing the first author's insider perspective with outsider perspectives of the other authors (Evered & Louis, 1981) .
app and update data. In this study we combine multiple levels of analysis, but most importantly we focus on "the app" as our primary unit of analysis. For that we collected archival data about the third-party apps and the platform software, and the changes over time. App data was gathered via AppAnnie (appannie.com) and included reports of the app versions including release date, version numbers and, if available, the release notes.
Our sample included all apps that we were aware of that work with the Hue system, resulting in a database of 115 iOS and 90 Android (Google Play) apps. The data was used to map the landscape of apps launched over time (initial release dates), and to analyze the frequency and timing of updates (release dates of later versions of the apps). Furthermore, the release notes provided qualitative data about the developer's intentions with the new app version. That is, for each update the developer is free to write a few sentences about the improvements he/she made to the app. From our analysis of the release notes, four updating practices emerged (i.e., bug fixing, ensuring compatibility, enhancing user experience and extending functionality) and served as the starting point to further unpack the dynamics around how complement quality is ensured over time.
Furthermore, the release notes of the Hue bridge firmware versions and the changelog of the API were collected to understand the changes in the platform system. We complemented this data with press releases (e.g., about product releases) and official statements by Philips (e.g., published on the developer forum) to get an understanding of the major events that took place on the platform side.
Developer interviews. Lastly, we held semi-structured interviews with thirdparty app developers to capture the external app developer's perspective. We started in February 2016, when we felt we had sufficient understanding of the Hue system both with regards to technology and organization. While continuing ongoing data collection within Philips we executed in total 21 semi-structured interviews with 20 third-party developers (one developer was interviewed twice) (see Table 4 -1 for an overview). Before we started the interviews we crafted an interview protocol that addresses the developers' "innovation journey" (Van de Ven et al., 1999) . We asked questions about the developers' ideas underlying the app, what challenges they face(d) during the development and maintenance of the app, choices that had to be made, and their interactions with and dependencies on other actors in the ecosystem.
By focusing not only on the outcome (the app), but instead on the practices of app development and maintenance we were able to uncover why developers innovated on the Hue platform and how their activities shifted over time.
We sampled our interviewees based on the apps that they developed. We aimed for maximum variety, and selected developers who vary on the following dimensions:
Developers that have (1) developed one app and multiple apps for Hue; (2) apps on Android, iOS (or both) and other platforms; (3) done many and few updates; and, (4) popular Hue apps and less well known apps. All interviews were voice recorded, and Furthermore, we took into account how these are related to users, other app developers and the platform owner. To facilitate the discussion among the authors we visualized these stories over time, plotting the updates with related events on a timeline. These discussions in turn were invaluable for collective sense making of our data.
In sum, by having unique access to both internal as well as external innovation activities, and by combining several sources of data we get a rich understanding of the Hue platform ecosystem over time. Next we will introduce the Philips Hue platform ecosystem before we turn to the findings of our analysis.
The Philips Hue platform ecosystem
When Philips launched the Hue in October 2012, the starter-kit (three bulbs and the bridge) was sold exclusively in Apple stores. Apple was chosen carefully as a partner, as the target group for Hue was similar to Apple users: consumers who value high quality and are willing to pay a premium price for intuitive to use products.
Initially the Hue system could only be controlled via the official Philips app for iOS. In 
another. That's how we bit by bit figured out."
Once the developers had accumulated sufficient knowledge of how the Hue system operated, it did not take long before the first third-party apps appeared that offered functionality beyond the official Philips lighting app. For example, while the official app merely offered features for changing light color and intensity and setting timers, the first third-party app "Hue Disco" lets users sync their Hue lights with the rhythm and beat of songs. 
Findings
To ensure an app maintains its integrity and functionality, developers must regularly update their apps. From our analysis of the third-party Hue apps released between September 2012 and September 2016, we observe that updating is a substantial part of third-party app development (see Figure 4-3) . On average, the amount of updates is about ten times the number of active apps, and thus increases strongly with the number of active apps, with some peaks of higher intensity. This is roughly similar for iOS and Android apps. This indicates sustained efforts to maintain and improve quality.
To better understand how developers ensure quality over time in the Hue platform ecosystem, we further unpack the different updating practices. Two updating practices are associated with ensuring integrity and two with maintaining functionality, that is bug fixing and ensuring compatibility contributing to the first, and enhancing user experience and adding new features to the latter (see Table 4 -2). Over time, some developers started to actively involve their users in preventative testing through creating their own "beta-test community". That is, engaged users will get early access to newer versions. In exchange, the beta-testers will report any problems that they detect back to the developer so that these can be fixed before public release.
Updating practices to ensure integrity
ensuring compatibility. Whereas bug fixing actions are targeted at the app only, ensuring compatibility refers to actions to maintain integrity with the platform components and interfaces that the app interoperates with. Since the third-party apps are built on the Hue platform and interact with its interfaces, any update of the platform potentially affects existing apps. As a result, apps may 'break down' and undermine the integrity of the system when they are no longer compatible with the evolving platform software. For example, an app that was built for an earlier version of the Hue bridge firmware, may fail to connect to the latest version of the firmware, ("Speedy Hue", July 26, 2016) .
Updating is required to keep up with the evolving platform software and hardware. Since the Hue product platform relies on embedded digital technology, the core platform components are malleable and can be continuously upgraded by Philips Lighting aimed at minimizing any negative consequences for the users, and undertook major effort by testing all 200 apps prior to the implementation to check which developers had ignored their calls for action. These developers were then traced down and contacted individually. Because Philips Lighting cannot 'force' thirdparty developers to update, they had to rely on developers' commitment their apps.
Despite these efforts, Philips Lighting was unable to prevent that some apps broke down after the update. 
And most of times I cannot even find that light here in Hong Kong!"
In addition, apps are not only embedded in the Philips Hue platform, but also other platforms (e.g., iOS or Android platform). Being embedded in multiple platforms complicates matters for developers. Some apps support other smart home product platforms in addition the Philips Hue lights, such as switches (e.g., Belkin
WeMo), beacons (e.g., iBeacon, Estimote) and competitor light bulbs (e.g., LIFX). All these platforms and associated components have their own evolution over time. 
Discussion
We undertook a study of the Philips Hue ecosystem to investigate how quality of complementary products is ensured over time. Our analysis of the Philips Hue platform and associated third-party apps released in the past four years revealed that third-party developers need to update regularly to maintain quality in the form of integrity and functionality. We identified four types of updating activities: bug fixing, ensuring compatibility, enhancing user experience, and adding new features.
Although it is entirely up to independent developers to decide what and when to update, our analysis shows that all ecosystem actors were involved in these updating practices but in different ways (we summarize the roles of the different actors in Table   4 -3).
Notably, we find that users play an active role in assisting and guiding developers by detecting and reporting integrity issues with the app. Such problems can be bugs that have to do with mistakes in the app's code base, or interoperability issues that emerge as a result of changes in the platform or platform interfaces. Philips Lighting, as the platform owner, is not such much involved in bug fixing, however, their role is key in ensuring compatibility. In particular as they are in control of the platform 
Implications
Our findings have several implications. First, we show that platform ecosystem actors become increasingly interdependent. Ensuring the quality aspect becomes an ongoing concern for all actors on the platform, including platform owners, complementors, and users, and each of them increasingly depends on the others.
Recall how developers relied on the tools provided by platform owners (such as specific API features) and how users rely on the features provided by complementors for using their entire Hue system. The more external developers have complemented apps and the more active users of the system, the more value they may deliver, but also the more they need to be taken into account. This complicates the challenge to ensure quality for platform owners. In particular, because complementors work autonomously from the platform owner, there is little control over their activities.
Yet, ensuring high quality complements is not a one-off task, but instead requires sustained engagement from the complementors.
Second, we show that users take on an important role in the platform ecosystem, one that is thus far overlooked because the current platform literature has mainly investigated interactions between platform owner and complementors (e.g., Boudreau, 2010) . The Philips Hue case emphasized the role that users play in facilitating the ongoing process of ensuring quality. Users of an app become an important actor as they report issues to the developer. Besides that, developers gain much user intelligence that facilitates the development of additional, new features and functionality, as well as enhances the app's user experience.
An implication for platform owners is that they should also take into account the role of the users in how to orchestrate the platform ecosystem. Instead of seeing complementors and users as two separate sides of the platform, there is 'hidden' interaction going on that is beyond the scope of the platform owner. Thus, in addressing either groups of actors of the platform ecosystem, it is important to consider the potential indirect effects a change or innovation has on the other parts of the platform. The tuning that takes place in the interactions between users and complementors (e.g., direct user feedback and feature requests) prove to be an important driver for continuous innovation by complementors.
Third, we show that complementors employ both reactive and anticipatory practices to deal with interdependencies between their complements and the platform ecosystem. In reactive updating practices the developers solves a problem after a breakdown surfaces. For a better user experience, such breakdowns are best avoided upfront (i.e., before the app is released). The app developers in our study tried to anticipate crashes through inviting users to participate in beta-testing before the actual release of a new version.
Relatedly, we found that when the platform owner takes a proactive role, it facilitates complementors in minimizing reactive fixing. That is, when a platform owner informs complementors of upcoming changes, complementors can proactively act upon them to prevent complements from breaking down. The Hue case showed that Philips' actions as a platform owner vis-a-vis complementors became more proactive over time (e.g., recall that Philips started to update developers of upcoming changes in the API well in advance). Whether such a proactive approach indeed prevents complements from breaking down, depends on whether developers also acted proactively by updating their apps before integrity issues could surface.
Fourth, our findings show that even if these dependencies are proactively addressed by platform owners and complementors, not all potential quality issues can be anticipated. How apps interact with the platform depend upon the particularities of users' situations like their version of the bridge software, lamps, or smartphone operating system. Moreover, the quality requirements of integrity and functionality may pose conflicting demands.
Fifth, our findings show negative aspects of network externalities. Typically, platform researchers have analyzed network effects as positive forces, assuming that more users and complementors provide more value (Boudreau, 2012; Katz & Shapiro, 1986) . However, when complementary products are of low functional quality or break down, this may negatively affect the value that users experience. Because such negative experiences are rooted in the interdependencies between the ecosystem actors, it may backfire on those actors, even if this is not deserved. For instance, users may blame the platform owner when a complement does not work properly, even though the platform owner does not control the complement. Vice versa, users could blame app developers for app failures although these might have been caused unintendedly by platform owner actions. Ecosystem participants need to actively manage these perceptions. For instance, Philips as platform owner communicated which apps were not updated to incorporate platform changes although developers had been notified and instructed. Thus, when the user experience is distributed over the ecosystem, the platform owners need to educate users on these roles and dependencies in the ecosystem.
Limitations and boundary conditions
Our study has a number of limitations that need to be considered. First, we have mainly considered the role of Philips as platform owner and Hue as platform. However, third-party developers also depend on other platform (owners) such as smartphone operating systems. Future research is needed to take such interdependencies also into consideration. Second, we only considered app updates as indicator of actions to ensure the quality of complements. However, the experience of quality goes beyond updates only. For instance, the overall user experience may also be improved when platform owners offer information or when developers provide technology support.
A possible boundary condition to be explored is the digital nature of the platform and complements. In our study the complementary products consist of apps, which can be reprogrammed even after they have been released. Therefore, updating complements is relatively easy. Although many platforms are fully or partially digital in nature, this does not hold for all platforms. Therefore, future research is needed whether similar processes can be found for hardware complements.
